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Profiles of Corruption in the 
Middle East 
Robert Looney* 
Middle East leaders should ask themselves if they will be remembered for resting 
reform or for leading it.-President Bush1 
Sadly, one would be hard-pressed to name a s!Jlgle Arab country in which grand cor-
ruption among high officials of the state was not endemic.-Paul Salem2 
Introduction 
Headlines reading: "Corruption Means the Poor Stay Poor in Oil-Rich 
State"3 or "Millionaire Mullahs"4 have become all too common. In fact, 
one is often hard pressed to pick up a reputable newspaper without some 
sort of corruption story on the politics, business or even in the sports pages. 
In countries developed and developing, large or small, market-oriented or 
otherwise, governments have been scarred by corruption scandals. In 
some cases, not only have prominent politicians lost their official positions, 
but entire governments have collapsed or been replaced.5 
Historically, the United States government's concern with corruption in 
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foreign countries stemmed from the belief that American exporters lost out 
on foreign deals because U.S. law prohibits the payment of bribes to for-
eign officials. In addition to the payment of bribes to foreign officials being 
a criminal act for U.S. companies, the bribes paid, naturaJJy, cannot be 
deducted as costs for tax purposes. Many U.S. competitors from other 
advanced industrialized countries do not have to deal with the same limi-
tations. 
More recently a greater sense of urgency over corruption has gripped the 
United States. Corrupt countries often ~end to be failed states and present 
a series of potential and real problems. These countries pose a threat to the 
U.S., not from an adversarial power position, bu~ from weakness and 
inability to control what happens inside their own borders. In those states 
and others like them-Afghanistan, So!}lalia, Liberia and Sudan-where 
internal control has been lost, it is often Americans who pay the price.6 Iraq 
was a failed state of a different sort, but still riddled with corruption. In fact, 
a broad band of weak and failed states-in the greater Middle East, as well 
as from South and Central Asia to African and the Caribbean-can harbor 
terrorists and drug traffic~ers, and spark humanitarian disasters. Ironically, 
these weak and ineffectual states have the ability to undermine global eco-
nomic growth and prosperity.7 
These realities hit home with the September 11th attacks. At that time it 
became all to apparent to U.S. policymakers that the lack of democracy 
and freedom, economic stagnation and widespread unemployment-all 
caused directly, or indirectly by corruption were driving many young peo-
ple in the Middle East and North Africa towards extremism and terrorism. 
The World Bank concurs, identifying corruption as the single biggest obsta-
cle to economic development. The World Bank estimates corruption-relat-
ed activities reduce world income by around five percent or more than 
$1.5 trillion a year.8 
In many Middle East countries, corruption has become endemic. 9 The 
existence of pro-American, yet autocratic regimes in the region no longer 
guarantees lasting stability or even prosperity. Many of the region's oil 
6Stuart Eizenstat and John Edward Porter, "Weak States are a US Security Threat," 
Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2004, p. 9. 
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Observer, December 12, 2003. 
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states for example have found that resources alone do not produce stabili-
ty or prosperity. In these economies, the potential for instability created by 
corruption, often finds its source in weak institutions, the absence of gov-
errunent procurement and auditing systems and a lack of revenue trans-
parency.10 
In a speech on November 7, 2003, President Bush summed up his 
Administration's assessment of the region: "As long as the Middle East 
remains a place where freedom does not flourish it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment and violence easy for export. And with the spread 
of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our 
fiends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo. "11 
In this regard, the adoption qf the United States' sponsored Broader 
Middle East and North African Initiative (a later version of the Greater 
Middle East and North African Initiative) by the Group of Eight 
Industrialized Nations (G-8) at their June 8-10 summit in Sea Island, 
Georgia is seen by the Bush Administration as representing a milestone in 
the war on terrorism. The initiative has two key elements. The first is the 
launching of a "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with The 
Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa." The second is a plan 
for the G-8 co11!1tries to support reform in Arab countries. 
While the G-8 deflaration (as well as earlier drafts) commit to "work with 
governments and business leaders to promote entrepreneurship, expand 
trade and investment, increase access to capital, support financial reforms, 
secure property rights, promote transparency and fight corruption,"12 the 
details of the initiative are unclear at this time perhaps because of the sen-
sitivity of the issue. 
To help appreciate the importance of the corruption issue, together with 
providing some sense of the factors that contribute to it in the Middle East 
and North African (MENA) countries, the following sections examine cor-
ruption in the region from an empirical perspective. V\lhat are the main 
patterns of corruption in the region? The effect of corruption on ~e 
economies? The impact that effective reforms and anti-corruption pro-
grams are likely to have on corruption? Based on this analysis a final sec-
10Manuel Paulo and Alex Vines, "Blessing or Curse," The World Today, 60:5, May 2004, 
pp. 26-27. 
11Quoted in "Bush: West Erred in Tolerating Mideast Corruption," CNN, November 7, 
2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOUTICS/ll/07/bush.rnideast.apl>. 
12 Broader Middle East/North Africa Partnership (Washington D. C.: The White House, June 9, 
2004), <;http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004 




tion draws some tentative conclusions for possible U.S. anti-corruption ini-
tiatives in the region. 
Corruption-Conceptual Issues 
While many varied definitions exist, the mqst popular and simplest def-
inition of public corruption is that it is the abuse of public power for pri-
vate benefit. This is the definition used by the World Bank. 13 Within this 
framework, acts of corruption cover .a: spectrum of activities ranging from: 
• Bureaucratic (or "petty") or political (or "grand"); for example, cor-
ruption by fl?.e bureaucracy or by· the political leadership. 
• Cost-reducing (to the briber) or benefit enhancing. 
• Briber-initiated or bribee-initiated. 
• Coercive or collusive; centralized or decentralized. 
• Predictable or arbitrary; and involving cash payments or not.14 
Defining corruption is one thing, measuring it is quite a different matter. 
Even if accurate data sfrnply measuring bribes paid existed, it still would 
ignore many corrupt practice~ of a more qualitative nature-tit for tat type 
acts for example. In actual practice, researchers of corruption issues usual-
ly rely on indirect measures of its prevalence in a country or institution. 
In this regard, questionnaire-based surveys of corruption perception (not 
actual measures of corruption) are probably the most realistic measures 
available. The best known of these surveys, the Transparency International 
Index, for example, assesses the p~rception of corruption on a scale of 0 to 
10. Ten refers to a corruption-free country~ Zero refers to a country where 
most transactions or relations are tainted by corruption. The variance of 
these indexes, which reflects how the views vary between respondents, is 
also important in assessing the figures on any individual country. The lat-
est Transparency International .Index for 2003 shows that of the MENA coun-
tries, Oman and Bahrain score the highest and are ranked 26th and 27th 
respectively. Another cluster of Gulf States, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE 
come in at 32, 35 and 37th respectively. Many, beginning with Syria at 
66th fall toward the bottom of the rankings. 
The World Bank Control of Corruption Index is also a perception-driven 
13Cf. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay ·and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III· 
Governance Indicators far 7996-2002 (Washington: Tht: World Bank.'; June 30, 2003), p. 4, , 
14Vito Tanzi, "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," 
IMF Staff Papers 45:4 (December 1998). o. 565. 
measure. It is derived from a series of sources15 and is part of a larger data 
set covering six main areas of governance-control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and gov-
ernment effectiveness. 16 The index has a mean of zero, with higher values 
indicating a greater control of co-option. 
Patterns of Corruption in the MENA Region 
Using this measure the MENA countries conveniently fall into several 
distinctive groups (Table 1), with most countries moderately above or 
below the norm for_ the world as a whole. Compared with other parts of the 
world progress at governance ref9rm in the MENA region has lagged 
somewhat. The MENA countries are: 
• somewhat below the norm (-0.151) for control of corruption; 
• considerably below other countries in voice and accountability 
(-0.906); 
• lagging in political stabilitY (-0.334), regulatory quality (-0.334) and 
government effectiveness (-0.196), and 
• near the norm with regard to the rule of law. 
Most MENA countries are fairly consistent in their reform efforts, either 
making fairly decerlt progress across the six main governance measures, or 
lagging behind across the board. The main exception is voice and account-
ability, where progress is consistently behind that made in other areas of 
governance. 
With the exception of rule of law, most MENA countries have made 
improvements in their governance in recent years. However, progress has 
not been even and a gap may be widening between those countries above 
the corruption norm, in most measures making relatively more progress, 
than those below the norm. 
Transparency International contends that corruption in MENA countries 
ultimately stems from the fact that the region is deficient in the two areas 
necessary for control of corruption-regulatory quality and voice and 
accountability. With regard to regulatory quality, there has been a tenden-
cy for institutional reforms accompanying economic liberalization pro-
15Cf. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters Ill· 
Governance Indicators for 7996-2002 (Washington: The World Bank, June 30, 2003), p. 97. 
16The complete data set and description of the measures can be found at: <www.world-





grams to lag. Underdevelopment of regulatory powers has created new 
opportunities for rent seeking. For example, when gr.anting private licens-
es for providers of mobile phone networks authorities in seyeral countries 
failed to put in place impartial and effective regulators. According to 
Transparency International the result was wide levels of discretionary powers 
enjoyed by private providers and state officials-.an environment conducive 
to corruption. 17 
The prevalence of authoritarian rule (lack ·of voice and accountability) in 
the region constitutes a hindrance to transparency and accountability at 
both the state and private levels. Lack of accountability often means state 
budgets are insufficiently itemized to permit close scrutiny, while impor-
tant state revenues are managed in extra-budgetary funds or parallel insti-
tutions that allow for discretionary spending. Libya's oil revenues, for 
example, constituting 95 percent of the nation's exports, are held in secret 
funds and controlled exclusively by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi and his 
associates. Furthermore, most MENA governrrients compensate for low 
popular support or poor legitimacy by granting opportunities for bribery 
to leading families or cliques. 18 
Clearly the installation of democratic institutions would help in promot-
ing accountability, but given the long history of corruption in the region, it 
would probably not be sufficient to eradicate corruption, at least in the 
short term. At a minimum, to accomplish this, better regulatory structures 
would have to be put in place in most countries as well as further strength-
ening of the rule of law. Even with reforms in these areas, old habits are 
likely to die hard-no doubt it will take some time before the cycle of cor-
ruption is broken in many of the MENA countries. 
Corruption Linkages 
A crude plot of per capita income and Transparency lnternational's 
Corruption Perceptions Index-CPI (Figure 1), suggests that with growth, 
rising incomes and awareness on the part of the population at large will 
place enough pressure on governments to undertake the necessary 
reforms. Perhaps, countries just naturally outgrow their need for and toler-
ance of corruption. 
After years of study, economists have concluded that a country's ability 
11Reinoud Leenders and 
Transparency International 
18lbid. 
Hohn Sfakianakis, "Middle East aiiq. North Africa," .'in 
' 
-
to accumulate physical and human capital and the efficiency with which it 
turns its capital and natural resources into goods and services are key fac-
tors in explaining differences in national incomes. Another truism is that to 
attain high rates of capital formation, investors require legal protection. In 
this regard, countries adhering to common law generally have the 
strongest legal protection for investors, followed by counties adhering to 
civil law adopted from the German and Scandinavian legal traditions; 










' ~,COO • • I 
• 
• -
• • • • • 
I 
• ... I 
• 
xi.mn • • • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • 
Chlla1 10.000 ramb 
••• 
I • . ... • . .. . .,.,. 
•• • . .. ,. Ntgsri~ :f ~ :t • •• • • 
• . It I' • I 
0 .. • I • 
0 1 ? 3 4 s 6 7 B 9 
-
20Jl Collt.pticn Pe.rcap'flon ln:la:x: 
SOU~CES: United r~krtions Humcn Dgv-ak:pnent ~P"'"~ 2JJ3. 
http:lJhdr.uidp.ay/r.;!Xf15fgoool/'2003. Global Com.ption Rsp;irt 20Jl, 
http://'www~ .globa~cnup flonrep:irt .org. 
Corruption Perception Index and Per Capita Income 
• 
10 
Legal systems that provide strong protection for investors have permit-
ted the development of sophisticated financial markets, which enhances 
the economy's ability to bear risk. This ability to spread risk over a multi-
tude of investors is critical for .entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
However, differences in legal systems are only part of the story. Actual 
enforcement of the law is equally or even more important The absence of 
enforcement enables corruption to render codified law ineffective. When 
laws are not enforced, corruption is able to weaken property rights and 
19Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, "Law 








deprive investors of compensation for risk taking and increase the uncer-
tainty about potential investment payoffs. This decreases the incentive to 
invest, which in tum dampens economic growth.20 
Another detrimental aspect of corruption is its tendency to distort mar-
kets. In turn, market distortion results in an inefficient allocation of 
resources, which further reduces wealth creation and growth.21 Specifically 
corruption: 
• Undermines the market system. Corruption often reduces the 
ability of the government to imp.ose the necessary regulatory control~ 
and inspections to correct market failures -a situation where social 
costs and benefits differ from private ones.22 The result often is· 
reflected in rates of investment and output. Similarly when corrupt 
governments create exploitativ~ monopolies for private interests, 
investment and output most always decline. 
• Distorts incentives. In a corrupt environment, able individuals 
often tend to find it more profitable to apply their ·energies to-rent 
seeking-the pursuit of. artificially high profits created · through the 
granting of specia] licenses, qu,otas and. other restrictions on market 
supply-instead of focusing on production or innovative activity. In 
these cases there is usually more money to be made in collecting 
rents than in actually producing the goods themselves. 
• Creates inefficient industries. In some instances governmental 
protection from foreign competition has actually encouraged the 
growth of local firms with negative value added, thus reducing 
national output. 23 
• Acts as an arbitrary and uncertain tax. Corruption's capricious 
nature creates high excess burdens as the cost of searching for the 
right person to bribe must be added to the cost of negotiating and 
paying the bribe. · 
• We~kens financial system. Because t?-e size of the bribe is often 
unclear, excessive cash balances must be kept, thus reducing the 
2jason Higbee and Frank Schmid, "Rule of Law and Economic Growth," Federal 
Reserve Bank of St.. Louis, International Economic Trends (August 2004). 
21Vito Tanzi, "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," 
IMF Staff Papers 45:4 (December 1998), pp. 583-84. 
22RH. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960), .PP· 1-
44. 
23The case of Pakistan is vividly illustrated in Stephen R Lewis, Pf!-kistan: lndustrialb/J,tton 
and Trade Policies (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). ' 
t 
f,' funds available from the financial system for productive investment-
~· in a corrupt economy a preponderance of transactions are in cash. 
~ 
I~ t Finally corruption is likely to increase poverty because it reduces the 
-
income earning potential of the poor. This effect stems from the fact that 
enterprises can protect themselves more easily from corrupt officials 
because: 
• They have specialized departments that can deal with aggressive 
bureaucrats. 
• They can use "facilitators,, individuals skilled at fighting through the 
jungle of opaque regulations and tax laws. 
• Their size makes them more immune to the extortion of petty 
bureaucrats. 
In turn the poverty created and maintained by corruption inhibits 
growth through the underdevelopment.of large domestic markets.24 
The Empirical Dimension 
These general propositions concerning the adverse impact of corruption 
on incomes and growth h:ave been confirmed in numerous empirical stud-
ies25 where it was found that corruption: 
1. Reduces investment and as a consequence reduces the rate of 
growth. Such reduction in investment is assumed to be caused by 
the higher costs and the uncertainty that corruption creates. 26 
2. Reduces expenditure on education and health, because these 
allocations do not easily lend themselves to corrupt practices on the 
part of those who make · budgetary decisions. Since human capital 
has been found to be one of the main sources of long-term economic 
growth, a major cost of corruption is this foregone income. 
3. Increases public investment because public investment projects 
lend themselves to "kick-backs." A related "White Elephant" effect 
is notorious for diverting capital from more productive private sec-
24Vito Tanzi, "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," 
IMF Staff Papers45:4 (December 1998), pp. 583-84. 
25Ibid. 
26Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Q,uarterly journal of Economics 110 (August 







4. Increases the acquisition of weapons systems where large "com-
missions" often accrue to the cronie~ of local officials. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that often the link between military expenditure and 
income growth is negative.27 
5. Reduces expenditure for operation and maintenance since the 
normal budgetary process makes corruption more difficult than in 
the case of normal procurement. The effect is to lower the produc-
tivity of public capital, slowing private investment thus producing _a 
drag on economic growth. 
6. Reduces tax revenue directly where bribes are paid for tax avoid-
ance. If governments run deficits to offset the loss of revenue, the 
ensuing inflation may distort and retard the pattern of investment. 
7. Reduces foreign direct investment because corruption has the 
same effect as a tax. The less predictaple the level of corruption (the 
higher is its variance) the greater its impact on foreign direct invest-
ment. 
Corruption and Per Capita Income in the MENA Region 
The previous sections suggest that improving the control of corruption is 
likely to be a productive way to initiate sustained growth in the MENA 
region. Logically these benefits would be even greater for those countries 
below the norm on the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index. However 
improvement in other areas of governance such as voice and accountabil-
ity may, from an empirical perspective have even a greater positive impact 
on the economy. The same could be said for improvements in the rule of 
law, or for that manner any of the other main areas of governance. 
Generalizations of this type for the region are a bit difficult because the 
governance and economic structures of MENA countries vary consider-
ably depending on whether or not they are oil exporters. These consider-
ations are especially important in the context of corruption-the nature or 
types of corruption found in the oil countries (rentier economies) varies 
considerably from that commonly found in the non-oil economies.28 
In the case of the oil-exporters, especially the oil monarchies and emi-
rates of the GUlf, the ruling families have in large part appropriated the 
" 
27Robert Looney, "Budgetary Dilemnias in Pakistan," Asian Sumey XXIV:5 (May 1994). 
28 Amity Shlaes, "In Poorer Nations, Oil Resources Can Be a Cuis~ Upon the People,." Los 
Angeles Times,June 21, 2004, B9. ·. 
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profits from the oil sector through blurring the distinction between public 
and private treasure and extending their familial involvement beyond oil 
to include local industry, services and trade, through public and private 
contracting.29 Since a great deal of this is internal, with foreign inves1ment 
often frozen out of a wide spectrum of industries, much of this type of cor-
ruption may slip by the standard corruption perception surveys. 
On the other hand, many of the non-oil MENA countries have the rem-
nants of former state-run socialist economies. Despite some ec.onomic lib-
eralization and privatization in the past couple of decades, high govern-
ment officials still have supreme control over th~ economic resources of 
the country. They not only control the massive public sector but they also 
dominate the private sector in that much of the. private sector is dependent 
on contracts or cooperation from the public sector to undertake its busi-
ness. "Government elites that trace their routes to austere military back-
grounds or political parties, have mellowed into traditional power holders 
who place their children and relatives in positions of power and profit and 
seek to translate their political authority info financial and economic power 
as well. "30 
Differences Between Rentier and non-Rentier MENA 
Economies 
• I 
Some of the differences in the environments of rentier and non-rentier 
MENA countries are reflected in their varied progress in governance and 
economic reforms. With the exception of the rule of law, the MENA coun-
tries as a whole score considerably below non-MENA states in all of the 
standard measures of governance. The gap is largest for voice and account-
ability. Within the MENA countries the rentier states score below the non-
rentier states in voice and accountability and regulatory quality. On the 
other hand the rentier economies have considerably more political stabili-
ty and less corruption, at least as revealed by the perception surveys. Rule 
of law is firmer in the rentier economies as is government effectiveness. 
In the economic area (high values reflect lower attainment) the MENA 
countries lag behind the non-MENA states considerably in trade policy, 
fiscal burden, government intervention, foreign investment, banking and 
finance, wages and prices and property rights. The MENA states have had 
2PPaul Salem, "The Impact of Corruption on Human Develop in the Arab World: A 







more progress in monetary policy, and regulation. Both groups are about 
even in controlling the informal market. There is no doubt that the gener-
ally low regulatory quality in the MENA countries, the protection from for-
eign trade and limited government effectiveness and large scale go.vem-
ment intervention provide a fertile environment for corruption to flourish. 
This is only reinforced by the huge MENA deficit in voice and accounta-
bility. 
Within the MENA region, the rentier countries have had more econom-
ic liberalization in the trade area, but their governments tend to intervene 
considerably more than in the case of the non-rentier states. The non-ren-
tier countries have created a much more favorable environment for foreign 
investment. They have also liberalized their markets to a greater extent 
than the rentier states. • 
Empirical Links Between Corruption, and Per Capita Income 
As noted above, the differences in governance and economic freedom 
between MENA and Non-MENA countries as well as those between the 
MENA rentier and non-rentier economies will likely affect the manner in 
which a certain level of corruption impacts on an individual country's 
economy. For the broad groupings of countries a statistical analysis31 sug-
gests that the plot diagram in Figure 1 is somewhat misleading. While the 
correlation between the two variables in the diagram is around 0.87 and 
highly significant statistically, other variables play an important role in 
effecting incomes. In addition, other groupings of countries paint quite a 
different picture. 
Specifically, while control of cop-uption is a major determinant of per 
capita income for a large sample of developing countries (125), it is not as 
important a factor as the improvement of over-all governance (an average 
of the six governance measures under examination). Whether or not a 
country was a rentier economy also positively affects per capita income. 
That is everything else equal, rentier economies have a higher per capita 
income than non-rentier economies. Finally, the share of capital formation 
in GDP also positively affects per capita income. 
These results change dramatically if the sample of countries is confined 
to those with per capita incomes under $1,000. For these countries capital 
formation as a share of GDP was the only statistically significant variable 
\ 
. 
' 31The results are available from the author upon request at <relooney@nps.edu>. 
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affecting per capita income. In other words, in and of itself, improvements 
in the control of corruption (or any other governance variable for that mat-
ter) would not advance a country's per capita income. 
For countries with per capita incomes greater than $1,000, control of cor-
ruption was the major determinant of per capita incomes. Again, given a 
rate of control of corruption, whether or not a country was a rentier econ-
omy affected per capita income with the rentiers attaining hig~er income 
levels. 
It's interesting to note that control of corruption was the most significant 
variable affecting per capita income in both the MENA32 and Non-MENA 
groups of countries. The major difference between the two groups was the 
presence of the rentier effect in the MEN:A sample, but not in the Non-
MENA group of countries. For the non-MENA countries, improvements 
in the rule of law impacted positively on per capita incomes. This was not 
the case for the MENA states. 
In short these findings support the argum..ent that control of corruption is 
a major factor affecting per capita income. However, over time improve-
ments in per capita income will no doubt affect the ability and willingness 
of nations to fight corruption. While there may be real world exceptions, 
these results appear to apply to countries with per capita incomes already 
over $1,000. Unfortunately, . these countries are often those who are the 
most defic;:ient in all areas · of governance. Perhaps one reason for the lack 
of reforms in these countries is the absence of immediate income gains to 
show for the sacrifices accrued. 
As suggested above, many countries that have achieved excellent 
progress in improving their governance have also made commensurate 
gains in reform.illg many key areas of economic policy. It is possible there-
fore that per capita income is really more related to economic reform 
rather than governance improvements. In this case the apparent associa-
tion between improvements in the control of corruption and higher per 
capita income would be spurious. Additional tests were undertaken to 
check for this possibility. 
The results (Table 2) basically confirm the importance of the control of 
corruption as a major factor affecting per capita incomes-this variable is 
still statically significant in affecting per capita incomes in both the MENA 
and non-MENA groups of countries after explicitly taking into account 
economic reforms. Of the economic variables, improvements in the fiscal 
• 
32Because of the small number of rentier economies (10) within the MENA group, mean-






burden is likely to have a positive impact on MENA per capita incomes, 
while improved trade policy is associated with higher per capita incomes 
in the non-MENA countries. 
Improvements in the Control of Corruption on Other Areas 
of Reform 
As suggested above, it is unlikely that the various aspects of governance 
and economic freedom are completely independent of each other-
progress in one area is likely to affect the willingness of policy makers in 
pressing ahead with similar reforms in other areas. Given that progress in 
all reforms is a desirable outcome, it's .of some interest to identify the extent 
to which anti-corruption drives have this carry over effect. As a basis of 
comparison, the analyses also included the overall-index of economic free-
dom along with the corruption index. 
The results (Table 3) suggest that anti-corruption efforts lead to somewhat 
different outcomes in the MENA countries than in the non-MENA coun-
tries, Most importantly, there appear to be many more reform linkages in 
the non-MENA group. While in both groups of countries, improvements 
in anti-corruption carry over to improvements in all of the other areas of 
governance, the non-MENA countries also experience many similar posi-
tive effects from improvements in economic freedom. Improved econom-
ic freedom leads to improved regulatory quality in both sets of countries, 
but in the case of the non-MENA group, positive changes in voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness and overall-governance also 
accrue from improvements in economic freedom. 
A similar pattern characterizes the various areas of economic freedom. 
While both groups of countries experience a number of positive stimuli on 
individual reform areas stemming from an improvement in their over-all 
index of economic freedom, the non-MENA countries also experience a 
similar effect from improvements in their control of corruption. For them, 
improvements in the corruption area carry over to trade policy, govern-
ment intervention, monetary policy, property rights, regulation and the 
informal markets. Trade policy appears to be the only area positively 
affected by improvements in corruption occurring in the MENA countries. 
Factors Affecting Corruption 
\ 
Finally, anti-corruption initiatives are likely to be affected by develop-
-
ments (positive or negative) in the various areas of governance and or eco-
nomic freedom. For the non-MENA countries (Table 4), improved gov-
ernment effectiveness appears to carry over to positive action in the con-
trol of corruption. For these countries, improved voice and democracy also 
appear important in this regard. In contrast, improvements in over-all eco-
nomic freedom and political stability appear to be the critical areas of 
improvement leading to improvements in the control of corruption. In 
other words the non-MENA countries appear to undertake anti-corruption 
measures via a more democratic political process that utilizes the pressure 
from a more efficient governmental structure to ~liminate corruption. In 
the MENA c.ountries, political stability appears to be critical for anti-cor-
ruption efforts. In this context, it is possible to view anti-corruption efforts 
as a necessary component in main~enance of gains in economic freedom. 
This model predicts well over 90 percent of the differences in corruption 
throughout the MENA region (bottom, Table 4). As one might anticipate, 
there is a slight tendency for it to under-predict the corruption in the high-




On both conceptual and empirical grounds, a strong case can be made 
for giving corruption a high priority in the MENA region. Improved con-
trol of corruption appears critical for moving up the per capita income lad-
der. Given the political dynamics in the region, efforts in the realm of cor-
ruption appear to pay high dividends by inducing improvements in other 
areas of governance, especially voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, and to a lesser extent regulatory quality. 
Unfortunately, an improved corruption environment does not appear to 
significantly stimulate carry-over reforms in the economic realm. 
Clearly its problematic the extent to which reforms can or should be 
encouraged by countries outside the region. A group of first class Arab 
minds, the Project for Democracy Studies in Arab Counties, has stressed 
the importance of indigenously initiated reforms: 
The sense of managing alone contrasts sharply with the attitude of most Arab com-
~en~ors, who delight in blaming the rest of the world for every misfortune, real or 
unagmed, and look to right all wrongs. The Oxford delegates believe that it is only 
33Mai Yamani, "The Middle East's Lost Resources: Arab Blues at Oxford," International 






Arabs themselves who can create the institutions in their societies that can lead them 
to a better future.33 
To a certain extent, the basis for an indigenous reform process may 
already exist in many of the key MENA countries. As noted above, in the 
MENA region, control of corruption appears to improve with increases in 
the over-all economic freedom score as well as improvements in political 
stability. The economic freedom index is a composite of the various cate-
gories-foreign investment, trade policy, b:anking and finance and the like. 
Given that improvements in the c9rruption situation in the MENA coun-
tries do not appear to stimulate carry-over economic reforms, there may be 
a very positive role for countries outside the region to play. The United 
States' direct approach of trying to speed up the democratization process 
so far has resulted in increased political instability in some of the countries 
in the region. However, through international organizations, such as the 
IMF and the WTO, the United States can play an active role in supporting 
reforms-for example, trade liberalization to comply with WTO agr.ee-
ments. Perhaps, the most effective path for the U.S. to take may well be an 






MENA Economies: S11mmary Statistics on Governance Indicators 
(Average 1996-2002) 
Country Voice Regulatory Political Government Rule of Control of 
Accountability Quality Stability Effectiveness Law Corruption 
Highly Corrupt Countries {Corruption Index< -0.75) 
Iraq -1.953 -2.923 -2.213 -1.626 -1.590 
Libya -1.563 -2.084 -0.920 -1.103 -0.967 
Sudan -1.684 -1.148 -2.238 -1.385 -1.295 
Average -1. 733 -2.051 -1. 790 -1.371 -1.284 
Fairly Corrupt Countries (Corruption Index >-0. 75<0.0 
Algeria -1.209 -0.799 -2.093 -0. 746 -0.677 
Egypt -0.803 -0.092 -0.167 -0.081 0.178 
Iran -0.912 -1.394 -0.292 -0.310 -0.558 
Lebanon ~0.456 0.117 -0.430 ~ -0.132 -0.1 14 
Syria -1.522 -0.955 -0.276 -0.796 -0.371 
Turkey -0.607 0.391 -0.923 -0.162 0.070 
Yemen 
-0. 768 -0.525 -1.278 -0.632 -0.946 
Average 
-0.896 -0.465 -0.779 -0.408 -0.345 
Less Corrupt Countries (Corruption Index >O.O<O. 75) 
Bahrain 
-1.007 0.863 -0.032 0.563 0.860 
Jordan 
-0.235 0.340 0.056 0.375 0.422 
Morocco 
-0.468 0.156 -0.059 0.083 0.289 
Oman 
-0.635 0.578 0.915 0.877 1.104 
Qatar 
-0. 720 0.307 1.141 0.721 1.060 
Saudi Arabia 
-1.298 -0.039 0.154 -0.106 0.670 
Tunisia 
-0. 740 0.282 0.499 0.803 0.314 
UAE 
-0.611 0.690 0.963 0.584 1.096 
Average 






















Relatively Uncorrupt Countries (Corruption Index > 0. 75) 
Kuwait -0.255 0.048 0.438 0.142 0.943 0.901 
Total Av 
-0.906 -0.334 -0.372 -0.196 0.002 -0.151 
Source: Compiled from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, 
Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, (Washington: 









Effects of Governance and Economic Freedom Reforms on Per Capita Income 
Independent Variable Standardized t significance Adjusted Coefficient statistic R square 
Dependent Variable: Average Per Capita Income 1995-2002-Purchasing Power 
Parity $1995 . 
(1) Developing Countries Sample (df =121) 
Rentier Dummy 0.233 
Regulation -0.250 
Capital Formation (0/o GDP) 0.166 
Control of Corruption 0.494 
• 
Trade Policy -0.161 










(2) Countries with Per Capita Income Greater than $1,000 (df =128) 
Control of Corruption 0. 786 14.631 0.000 
Trade Policy -0.135 -2.501 0.014 
Rentier Dummy 0.154 3.194 . 0.002 










(3) Countries with Per Capita Income Greater less than $1,000 (df =18) 
Capital Formation (O/oGDP) .470 2.193 .042 .175 
(4) MENA Countries (df =16) 
Fiscal Burden 





(5) Non-MENA Countries (df =130) 
Control of Corruption .807 
Trade Policy -.129 



















Notes: Stepwise Regression with all variables entered initially. Independent variables = rentier 
dummy, primary producer dummy, capital formation (0/o .GDP). Independent governance variables: 
voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption, overall governance (average of governance measures). Economic freedom vari- ; 
ables: trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign investment, bank- j 
ing and finance, ·wages and prices, property rights, regulation, black markets. Non-dummy variables 
are averages over the 1996-2002 period for governance and 1995-2002, economic freedom. , 
Governance data from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters · 
III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, (Washington: World Bank, \June 30, 2003). Index: · of ~· 
Economic Freedom Rankings, (Washington: Heritage Foundation), various\issues).Capital formation 1 





Impact of Anti-C.Orruption and Economic Reforms on Governance and Economic Freedom 
Country Sample 
Reform Aiea Over$ 1,000 MENA non-MENA Rentier 
per-Capita Countries Countries Economies 
Income 
Governance Measures 
Voice, Accountability CORR EF CORR CORR EF CORR 
Political Stability CORR CORR CORR CORR 
Govt Effectiveness CORR EF CORR CORR EF CORR 
Regulatory Quality EF CORR EF CORR EF CORR EF 
Over-All Govem~ce CORR EF CORR • CORR EF CORR 
Economic Freedom 
Trade Policy EF CORR C ORR • EF CORR CORR 
Fiscal Burden CORR EF EF CORR EF EF 
Govt Intervention EF CORR EF CORR EF 
Monetary Policy EF EF EF CORR CORR 
Foreign Investment EF EF EF EF CORR 
Banking & Finance EF EF EF EF 
Wages & Prices EF EF EF 
Property Rights CORR EF I EF EF C.ORR EF 
Regulation . EF CORR EF EF CORR EF 
Informal Market CORR EF EF CORR EF CORR EF 
Notes: CORR= Average corruption index 1996-1998, EF =average economic freedom score, 1995-
1999. Governance and Economic Freedom Measures = average scores, 2000-2002. Only statistically 
significant results reported. In all cases for the statistically significant variables, EF and CO RR, 






Effects of Governance and Economic Freedom Reforms on Corruption 
Independent Variable StandardiZed t significance Adjusted Coefficient statistic R square 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index (Average 2000-2003} 
. 
Non-MENA Countries 
Government Effectiveness .832 19.516 .000 
• 
Rentier Dummy .110 3.951 .000 
Voice, Accountability .164 3.681 .000 
MENA Countries 
Rentier Dummy .234· 4.526 .000 
Economic Freedom Index -.483 -7.417 .000 
Political Stability .561 8.589 .000 
MENA Country Actual Corruption Predicted Actual-Predicted Scores 























Total MENA Averages 
20 
-0.673 
-0.237 
-0.497 
-1.315 
-0.433 
-0.880 
-1.112 
-0.518 
-0.341 
-0.697 
-0.670 
0.655 
0.061 
0.971 
0.162 
0.875 
0.821 
0.326 
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-o.925 
0.591 
-0.073 
-0.742 
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-0.347 
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-0.116 
-0.867 
-1.240 
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-0.234 
-0.798 
-0.633 
0.778 
0.153 
0.727 
0.037 
0.764 
0.732 
0.473 
0.271 
1.005 
0.550 
-0.073 
'. 
0.069 
-0.024 
-0.149 
0.002 
-0.316 
-0.012 
0.128 
-0.064 
-0.106 
0.101 
-0.037 
-0.123 
-0.092 
0.243 
0.124 
0.110 
0.088 
-0.147 
0.250 
-0.081 
0.041 
0.000 
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